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ABSTRACT 
In distributed environments, access control decisions depend on statements of multiple agents rather than 
only one central trusted party. However, existing policy languages put few emphasis on authorization 
provenances. The capability of managing these provenances is important and useful in various security 
areas such as computer auditing and authorization recycling. Based on our previously proposed logic, we 
present several case studies of this logic. By doing this, we show its expressiveness and usefulness in 
security arena. 
KEYWORDS 
Authorization Logic, Authorization Provenance  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The popularity of Internet has promoted wide applications of distributed systems such as peer-
to-peer systems and grid. These systems feature dynamics, provisionality, lack of complete 
information, and decentralization, consequently they introduce more complex authorization 
scenarios. It is widely agreed that a declarative and reasonably expressive language with an 
unambiguous semantics would be a key to distributed access control. Based on this observation, 
major research efforts have applied logics into the design of authorization languages. The set of 
policies written in such a language is regarded as a policy base. When a principal requests an 
access to resources, the request is translated to a query of the policy base. The access is granted 
if the answer to the query is positive and denied otherwise.  
One main line of preceding languages depends on Datalog and its variants, such as DL, RT, 
Binder, and SecPAL [11, 12, 5, 3]. Generally speaking, these languages achieve a balance 
between the expressiveness and computational tractability. However, they hardly capture some 
important aspects of distributed authorizations. Consider a delegation “A says B cansay f” in 
SecPAL. The delegable fact f can only be an atom here. No rule such as 1 2f f  is allowed to 
delegate. Not only may an agent trust others in the truth of facts, it may also depend on others’ 
judgement about the relation between facts. For example, a bookshop assistant may rely on her 
manager about whether a discount could be given to students; that is “Assistant says Manager 
cansay discount student ”. In addition, their reasoning ability is confined to administrators’ 
positive knowledge about facts. Let F denote the set of facts in a SecPAL policy base. All 
authorizations are conditional on the administrator’s knowledge about facts in F, i.e., “Admin 
says f”, either derived or directly phrased. However, due to the lack of complete information in 
distributed environments, some authorizations have to rely on administrators’ partial knowledge 
or their knowledge about others’ knowledge. For instance, the bookshop assistant knows that a 
book may be sold only if she knows that the manager knows that the price is fair, but not just if 
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she knows that the price is fair; again, the bookshop assistant knows that a student may borrow a 
book for a two-day preview if she considers it is possible that the student will return the book. 
Another mainstream is to interpret policies using the Kripke structures [2, 6]. In previous works, 
belief has been used implicitly or explicitly to facilitate distributed access control. Most logics 
for distributed authorizations are centered around “A says f”. Intuitively, the meaning of “A 
says f” is that A supports f, i.e., A believes that f is true. Also, in [1] Abadi stated that “In 
general, the proof may exploit relations between A and B and other facts known to the reference 
monitor”. We argue that partial and nested knowledge besides in addition to pure facts are 
crucial to make correct access control decisions. There is already a potential trend to make 
beliefs explicit. Gurevich and Neeman remarked that knowledge should be made explicit due to 
its importance in authorization languages [7]. Besides, in [6] Garg and Abadi showed that  
Kripke semantics leads to several advantages such as comparisons of access control logics. 
Since delegations provide a flexible way to evaluate the trustworthiness of a statement in 
distributed environments, most current policy languages support delegating capabilities. Briefly, 
delegations enable agent A to speak on behalf of agent B with respect to a certain statement, say 
ϕ . Delegations can also form a delegation chain with certain length. Generally speaking, we 
can assume the agent at the starting point of a delegation chain is in charge of the requested 
resources. We refer to the set of agents who issue the delegations appearing in a delegation 
chain as a provenance because they actually describe from where beliefs are concluded. We 
observe that existing languages do not distinguish between the same conclusions but with 
different provenances. Consider the policy base PB {“Alice says Bob cansay deletefile”, “Bob 
says deletefile”, “Alice says Charlie cansay deletefile”, “Charlie says deletefile”} written in 
SecPAL. Then from this PB, one can conclude “Alice says
∞
 deletefile”. But it is not clear 
whether it is with the help of Bob or of Charlie that PB comes to this conclusion. 
There are several reasons why it is crucial to make clear conclusions’ provenances. First, it is 
possible to enforce fine-grained constraints on provenance. For example, constraints forbidding 
certain provenances appear difficult to be enforced in previous approaches. Second, one may 
trust more than one agent in some facts and to different degrees, especially when policies are 
specified by multi-authors. And how much trust would suffice depends on the requested 
accesses. For instance, the bookshop may delegate the fact that “David is a student” to both the 
registrar and the professor Emma. Obviously, the registrar is at least as trustworthy as Emma in 
this respect. Emma’s statement that “David is a student” is enough for the bookshop to give a 
student discount to David, whereas the registrar’s testimony is needed when David wants to 
borrow books. Third, by indicating precisely who executes the delegated authority, we provide a 
more useful log if proofs of authorization decisions are included in the log [16], therefore it 
would be easier to work out who is responsible for which statements and derivations. 
In our previous works [8, 9], we proposed an access control logic DBT based on the classical 
KD45 belief framework. DBT extends the BT logic [14] by introducing a new modal operator 
iD  for each agent i into the underlying distributed authorizations. iDϕ  is designed to express 
the provenance of ϕ . Thus, DBT integrates the belief, trust, and provenance within a unified 
logical framework. In this paper, we present several case studies of this logic, including 
examples for subjective attributes and incomplete information. By doing this, we show its 
expressiveness and usefulness in security arena. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The background is introduced in Section 2. The 
motivation of authorization provenance is illustrated in a case study in Section 3, followed by a 
case study of subjective attributes in Section 4 and discussions of policies with incomplete 
information in Section 5. Finally, we conclude in Section 6. 
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2. BACKGROUND: THE LOGIC DBT 
 
Consider a finite set of agents AG = {1, · · · ,N}. We have three types of modal operators for 
each agent i: iB , iD , and ijT . iBϕ  means that agent i believes ϕ  or that i says ϕ ; and ijT ϕ  reads 
that agent i trusts agent j on  or that i delegates ϕ  to j. iDϕ  means that “due to agent i, ϕ  holds” 
or that i causes that ϕ  holds. A subset AE of AG is called an agent expression. Given an 
AEAG, we also define an operator AED  based on iD  for each iAE. AED ϕ  means that the set 
AE of agents together cause ϕ . Let Prop be a set of primitive propositions. The set of well-
formed formulas is inductively defined as follows: 
:: | | | | | | | ii i AE jp B D D Tϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ= ¬ ∧ 
 
Readers are referred to [8, 9] for details. 
3. THE USAGE OF OPERATOR DAE 
 
The most distinguished feature of DBT is the introduction of the operator AED . We now show 
the intuition of AED  through examples. 
Suppose that a company manages two resources: computers and printers. This company lets two 
security administrators, SA1 and SA2, specify policies for accessing computers and printers, 
respectively. SA1 specifies that a clerk acknowledged by the human resources, HR, may be 
allowed to access printers. But SA2 thinks Manager’s attestation is enough for a clerk to use 
computers. Putting together, the company’s policy base may be as follows. 
 
Suppose that Manager issues to Alice a credential (5) which says Manager believes Alice is a 
clerk. If interpreting by some existing logics such as BT in [14], from (3) and (5), one can 
derive that Company believes that Alice is a clerk. As a result, Alice may log onto a computer 
because of (4); but from (2), Alice may also use printers. The latter authorization departs from 
the policies in that SA1’s intention on accesses to printers is not enforced; it also violates the 
principle of least of privilege. 
 
A possible solution to handle this difficulty is to rename the attribute “clerk(Alice)” in (1) and 
(2) as “HR-clerk(Alice)”, and that in (3) and (4) as “Manager-clerk(Alice)”, respectively. Then 
Manager only says that he/she believes Manager-clerk(Alice), which derives that Company 
believes Manager-clerk(Alice) together with the renamed (3), but not that Company believes 
HR-clerk(Alice) with the renamed (1). But this solution is ad hoc and highly dependent on 
implementation, and complicates the analysis of policy bases. 
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Alternatively, one may attempt to assemble Company’s policy base instead as follows: 
 
This policy base may derive improper conclusions, however. We can assume that the statement 
(6) is from Company; that is Company bases its belief on others’ beliefs. However, from (6) it 
follows that 
 
(8) is HR’s assertion. As a result, Company can derive HR’s belief from its own belief. If, for 
some reasons, Company forbids Alice from using printers by issuing ( )CompanyB access printers¬ . 
Then, one may deduce ( )HRB clerk Alice¬ ; that is, HR does not believe clerk(Alice). Agents 
should not derive others’ belief simply from their own belief. Interestingly, some recent works 
on policy languages [3, 7] avoid this form of policies as well. 
Our solution is to replace (2) and (4) with the following rules. 
 
From (5), it follows that Manager causes Company to believe that clerk(Alice), which, together 
with (10), implies that Company believes that Alice can access computers. However, with (5), 
one can not derive that HR causes Company to believe that clerk(Alice). 
The essential reason of this violation is that there are multiple trust sources inherently for some 
attributes. For example, the local party may trust both school’s Registrar and Professor to say 
student(Bob). This is not exclusive to multi-author policy bases, though. On the other hand, to 
achieve availability and resilience, the local party may intentionally delegate the identification 
of attributes to more than one party. 
Despite agents may be delegated with the identification of the same attribute, they differ in the 
extent to which Local may trust them about the attribute. For example, credentials about an 
attribute student(Bob) from both school’s Registrar and Professor may be trusted by Local, but 
to different extents and for different purposes. Owing to the difference of importance and 
sensitiveness among resources, the local party may consider credentials from different trustees 
as sufficient for accesses to resources to be granted, even though these credentials support the 
same attribute. However, when putting together in one policy base, it is likely that these policies 
affect each other. The introduction of “due to” can alleviate this influence, and enable the local 
party to safely base authorizations on the same set of attributes. 
4. SUBJECTIVE ATTRIBUTES 
 
Subjective attributes are specially demanded in some distributed systems, such as peer-to-peer 
networks and electronic commerce systems. In these systems, agents may express opinions 
about other agents’ behaviors. Looking from different perspectives, agents may view one 
happening in totally different ways, or even in conflicted ways. For example, Alice may regard 
Cathy a good peer because of uploading some files, whereas Bob could think of this behavior 
offending. However, it is not something right or wrong, but simply subjective. Thus, 
	
	



	

	




 27 
authorization logic should be able to accommodate this divergence so that policies about 
subjective attributes are amendable to formal analysis. For better explanation, we illustrate this 
by an example. 
To support subjective attributes, policy bases should satisfy two requirements. On one hand, 
trustees should have discretion to judge the truth and falsity of an attribute. For example, if 
Alice puts trust on Bob about whether or not goodPeer(David), Bob should be free to say that he 
believes goodPeer(David) or the opposite. On the other hand, Local should respect the 
divergence of viewpoints among trustees. Assuming that Alice also trusts Cathy about 
goodPeer(David), if Bob and Cathy have opposite opinions about goodPeer(David), Alice 
should treat this case as normal but not conflicted. 
Consider a group of four peers in a peer-to-peer network, Alice, Bob, Cathy, and David. Alice 
has a policy base which controls the accesses to her shared directories. Alice trusts both Bob 
and Cathy to tell whether or not David is a good peer. When both of them consider David as 
good, Alice permits accesses to dir; but if only one of them thinks so, only access to subdir1 or 
subdir2 is allowed. 
Let ( )goodPeer Davidϕ =  and let ( )0 ,canAccess David dirϕ = , ( )1 , 1canAccess David subdirϕ = , 
and ( )2 , 2canAccess David subdirϕ = . Using DBT, we may specify policies as follows: 
 
 
Previous policy languages rarely support subjective attributes. To meet the first requirement, 
Alice’s policy base should contain both ( )AliceBobT goodPeer David  and ( )AliceBobT goodPeer David¬ . 
However, most Datalog-based policy languages trade off the ability to delegate negative 
attributes for other advantages like computational tractability one one hand; on the other hand, 
some access control logics forbid delegating both ( )goodPeer David  and ( )goodPeer David¬  to 
the same agent [6]. Without this capability, agents are not able to express their subjective 
judgements. More importantly, supposing that Alice makes the delegations in (11) and (12), and 
that both ( )BobB goodPeer David  and ( )CathyB goodPeer David¬  reside in Alice’s policy base, 
existing access control logics would deduce conflicts. In spite of the possibility of agents lying, 
it is natural for agents to have different (or even opposite) viewpoints for subjective attributes. 
Since Local lacks of complete information, it depends on other agents’ statements. Here, Alice 
believes ( )goodPeer David  because of Bob, whereas Cathy also causes Alice to believe 
( )goodPeer David¬ . The point is that Alice has two ways to collect information. When 
objective attributes are involved, it is reasonable to conclude policy bases conflicted in this case 
and employ some conflict resolving mechanisms. However, as far as subjective attributes are 
concerned, it is more acceptable to let the local party put different weights on how information 
is aggregated. 
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In the DBT representation above, the semantics allows Alice to delegate both ( )goodPeer David  
and ( )goodPeer David¬  to Bob. We use the operator iD  to denote the subjective judgements as 
in (13), (14) and (15). For example, when both ( )BobB goodPeer David  and 
( )CathyB goodPeer David¬  are in Alice’s policy base, (11) and (12) derive 
( )Bob AliceD B goodPeer David  and ( )Cathy AliceD B goodPeer David¬ , respectively. Thus, it follows 
from (14) that Alice believes that David can access subdir1. 
5. POLICIES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
 
There are some attributes whose member would be denied access explicitly because their 
accessing may incur great loss to Local. For example, an airport, denoted as Local, would forbid 
terrorists to board. We refer to requesters bearing these attributes as adversaries. The problem is 
that, an adversary would withhold some credentials to evade explicit denials, and adversary 
authorities would not inform Local of adversaries. No terrorist, of course, would reveal this 
attribute and terrorist organizations would not inform the airport. 
The airport depends on its Scrutiny Unit (SU) to identify potential terrorists. With existing 
policy languages, one tempting solution is to include ( )LocalSUT terrorist X  or (and) 
( )LocalSUT terrorist X¬  in the policy base. However, we argue that it is unreasonable for Scrutiny 
Unit to be able to say a passenger is or not. Because, in most cases, Scrutiny Unit may only 
discover some clues showing that a passenger is possibly a terrorist. That is, Scrutiny Unit 
generally only suspects someone. Neither ( )SUB terrorist X  nor ( )SUB terrorist X¬  captures the 
meaning of “suspect”. 
In DBT, the airport’s policy bases may consist of the following formulas. 
 
From (16) and (17), Local delegates to Scrutiny Unit whether or not Local should consider a 
passenger as a potential terrorist; and by (18) and (19), Local explicitly denies or permits 
passengers to board, respectively, according to Scrutiny Unit’s statements. If a passenger 
obtains a certificate from Scrutiny Unit like (20), the airport allows him/her to board; But if 
anyone get a certificate (21), he/she would be denied to board, whether or not he/she submit the 
certificate. 
Obviously, there may be both false positives and false negatives; Scrutiny Unit may issue (21) 
to a non-terrorist and (20) to a real terrorist. Since no complete information is available, it is 
unavoidable. But the rate depends on the trusted agent and the requested resources. Besides, as 
for false negative, other techniques, such as audit and intrusion detection alarm, may be 
deployed, which is beyond the scope of this work. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We illustrated DBT is able to capture provenance-aware scenarios. This expressiveness is the 
original motivation of DBT and is the most important feature. Existing access control logics put 
few emphases on authorization provenances. As mentioned in Section 1, existing logics can be 
grouped into the modal logic based and the Datalog based frameworks. For the first group, since 
they are interpreted in the same framework as DBT, it seems feasible to extend these logics to 
express provenance or to build a new logic on them. Take the logic ABLP [2] for instance. 
ABLP works around two operators: “says” and “speakfor”. Since formulas constructed using 
these two operators are interpreted by Kripke structures, we may define operators for 
provenances and impose some reasonable relations among modalities. The other collection 
based on Datalog includes Delegation Logic (DL) [11], SecPAL [3], and RT [13], ect.. This 
group features in tradeoff between reasonable expressiveness and tractability. Nevertheless, 
none of these policy languages focuses on what the operator iD  is designed to capture. It also 
appears difficult to incorporate the notion of authorization provenances into these logics. 
Because specific translation rules between these logics and Datalog may have to be redesigned; 
another requirement on these rules is that the resulted semantics should bring about rational 
connections among agents’ statements, authorizations, and provenances. Still, a notion of proof 
tree is used in literature. SD3 [10] produces a proof tree along with the answer to each query to 
see if the proof is correct. RT0 [13] forms delegation chains for a policy base, but its focus is on 
how to store and retrieve credentials in a distribute way. Neither of them can answer if a 
conclusion with a specific provenance holds. 
As future work, we are planning to integrate authorization provenances into auditing and 
recycling, and invest how well quantitatively provenances benefit these functions through 
experiment evaluation. 
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